目前分類:英美法的筆記 (7)
- Oct 20 Thu 2011 10:19
Russell v. texas co. 契約法case
- Apr 27 Wed 2011 16:26
DEFENSE IN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS
- Mar 05 Sat 2011 21:38
Anderson v. Minnneapolis, st.p. s.stm r.r. co.
Anderson v. Minnneapolis, st.p. s.stm r.r. co.
Facts:
This is a fire case brought against the defendant railway company.
Plaintiff had a verdict.
The appeal is from an order denying a motion in the alternative for
上訴
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.
A forest fire, which originated in a bog and was found by the jury to have
沼澤, 泥塘
been caused by the negligence of the defendant, swept over a large area.
經過
It merged with another fire of independent and uncertain origin, and the
合併 不確定的起源
combined fires burned over plaintiff’s property.
燒毀
Issue(s):
Whether the defendant was liable that the origin fire caused by the
negligence of defendant might not cause harm to plaintiff but combine
with another fire, superior in strength but of unknown origin?
Rule of Law:
- if plaintiffs property was damaged by a number of fires combining
one…being the fire plead …the others being of no responsible origin, but
of such sufficient or such superior force that they would have produced
the damage to property regardless of the fire pleaded, then defendant was
not liable.
minn. 357,………….. this court considered the cook case but refrained
from expressing approval or disapproval of its doctrine. The supreme
court of Michigan has referred to it as good law….the supreme court of
Idaho says the opinion is logical and well reasoned , but the discussion is
in a large measure theoretical and academic….judge Thompson in his
work on negligence, vol.1.§739, says that the conclusion reached is so
clearly wrong as not to deserve discussion. If the cook case merely decide
that one who negligently sets a fire was not liable if another’s d property
is damaged, unless it is made to appear that the fire was a material
element in the destruction of the property, there can be no question about
the soundness of the decision. But if it decides that if such fire combines
with another of no responsible origin, and after the union of the two fires
they they destroy the property, and either fire independently of the other
would have destroyed it, then irrespective of whether the first fire was or
was not a material factor in the destruction of the property, there is no
liability , we are nor prepared to adopt the doctrine as the law of this state.
If a fire set by the engine of one railroad company unites with a fire set by
the engine of another company, there is joint and several liability , even
thought either fire would have destroyed plaintiff’s property. But if the doctrine of the cook case is applied and one of the fires is of unknown
origin, there is no liability. G.S. 1913. §4426,leaves no room for the
application of a rule which would relieve a railroad company from
liability under such circumstances. Moreover the reasoning of the court in
mcclellan v. st. paul, m & m. ry. Co. 58 minn. 104,59 n. w. 978 leads to
the conclusion that , regardless of the statute, there would be liability in
such a case. We, therefore ,hold that the trial court did not err in refusing
to instruct the jury in accordance with rule laid down in the cook case.
Analysis:
- if the plaintiff was burned out by some fire other than the bog fire,
which other fire was not set by one of the engines, then, of course, the
defendant was not liable. if the plaintiff was burned out by fire set by one
of the defendant’s engines in combination with some other fire not set by
any of its engines, then it is liable.
- if you find that other fire or fires not set by one of defendants engines
mingled with one that that was set by one of the defendants engines, there
may be difficulty in determining whether you should find that the fire set
by the engine was amaterial or substantial element in causing plaintiff’s
damage. If it was, the defendant is liable, otherwise is not.
- if you find that bog fire was set by the defendants engine and that
some greater fire swept over it before it reached the plaintiff ‘s land., then
it will be for you to determine whether that bog fire. Was a material or
substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s damage. If it was defendant was
liable. If it is not, defendant is not liable. If the bog fire was set by one of
the defendant’s engines, and if one of the defendant’s engines also set a
fire or fires west of kettle river, and those fires combined and burned over
plaintiff’s property, then the defendant is liable.
Conclusion:
We find no error requiring a reversal and hence the order appealed
from is affirmed.
維持原判決 原告可向鐵路公司求償
- Feb 10 Thu 2011 19:33
Zeni v. Anderson 複習筆記
Fact
The defendant(被告),a college student,was driving with a passenger. The plaintiff,a 56-year old registered nurse,was walking
along a path(路徑)through the snow along the right side of the road between parked cars and the roadway.A sidewalk was in place,
but it was covered with ice and considered to be dangerous. The director of security had been injured falling on the sidewalk.The
defendant's car struck the plaintiff on the driver's right side causing substantial injury as well as amnesia.Relevant statutes stated
that it is unlawful for pedestrians to walk on the highway where sidewalks are in place.Or in their absence,to walk on the left side
of the road facing traffic.The plaintiff failed on both these elements.
Issue
What is the effect to violation of statute for the plaintiff? 原告違反法律 被告是否可以以原告違反法律作為對被告的抗辯
rule of law
Section288a of the second Restatement,referred to in principle case,
1. An excused violation of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation is not negligence.
2. Unless the enactment or regulation is constructed not to permit such excuse,it's violation is excused when
a. the violation is reasonable because of the actor's incapacity
行為者的不得已 ex:行動不方便之人
b. he neither knows nor should know of the occasion for compliance
不知法規不存在
c. he is unable after reasonable diligence or care to comply
突發疾病
d. he is confronted by an emergency not due to his own misconduct
由於某些事項導致自己的失誤 ex:躲避事務導致車禍
e. compliance would involve a greater risk of harm to the actor or to others
遵守法規會造成他人與自己更大之風險
Application
There are three ways to explain the ability of negligence when there was a violation of statute
1. Violation of statute as rebuttable presumption
違反法令 推定過失
2. Violation of statute as negligence per se
當然過失 本質上有過失
3. Violation of statute as evidence of negligence
違反法令 (證據)
欲轉借請務必留言
- Oct 03 Sun 2010 16:18
garratt v. dailey 單字
liability 傾向[U][(+to)]
責任, 義務[U][C][(+for)][+to-v]
【口】不利條件[C]
【會計】負債, 債務[P]
infant 嬰兒
【律】未成年人
a. 形容詞
嬰兒的; 供嬰兒用的
初期的; 初創的
未成年的
allereged
聲稱的, 被說成的, 被斷言的
presented 贈送, 呈獻[(+to/with)]
likewise同樣地, 照樣地
contention論點, 主張 爭論; 爭吵; 爭奪; 競爭
come out出現 出版
canvaslawn chair
deliberately慎重地; 謹慎地
pull out 撤軍; 撤離
testify作證[(+for/against/to)]
unwilling不願意的; 不情願的; 厭惡的[+to-v...
testimony證詞, 證言[C][U][+that...
subsequent後來的, 其後的, 隨後的
thereto向那裡
described描寫, 描繪, 敘述
premise假定, 假設; 前提
therein在其中; 在那裡; 在那點上; 在那時
formerly以前, 從前
dexterity靈巧, 熟練, 敏捷
fracture破裂; 斷裂; 折斷; 骨折
hereinafter在下
set forth提出
preponferance優勢; 優越
wilful 任性的; 倔強的; 頑固的
unlawful不合法的; 犯法的; 不正當的
unauthorized未被授權的, 越權的; 獨斷的
appurtenant附屬的, 從屬的
circumstance情況, 環境; 情勢
indicate指示; 指出[+(that)][+wh-]
conceded(勉強)承認
fractured破裂; 斷裂; 折斷; 骨折
obviate排除, 消除
retrial再審; 再試
dismiss讓...離開; 把...打發走
entry進入, 入場; 出賽, 參加
authority權, 權力; 職權
notable值得注意的, 顯著的
tort侵權行為
applicable可應用的, 合用的; 可實施的
wrongful不正當的; 不講道理的; 壞的
appellant上訴人
privilege特權; 優特
thereof其
substantially本質上, 實質上; 大體上
produced生產, 出產; 製造; 創作
conceded(勉強)承認
volitional有意志的
proved to 證明
patently明白地; 公然地
proof證據; 物證
negligent疏忽的; 粗心的
reckless不注意的, 不在乎的; 魯莽的, 不顧後果的
italicized用斜體字排(字); 在稿件的(字)下劃橫線表示要...
portions(一)部分
mere僅僅的, 只不過的
prank胡鬧; 惡作劇
absolve使免除(責任, 義務等)[(+from/o...
liability傾向[U][(+to)]
dismissed讓...離開; 把...打發走[(+fro...
had passed通過了
remand遣回; 送還
clarification (液體的)澄清, 淨化; 澄清法 意義等的澄清、說明
specifically特別地; 明確地; 具體地
significance重要性, 重要
capacity容量, 容積
course material路線材料
merit價值
contention論點, 主張
warrents授權; 批准
remanded遣回; 送還 將...還押候審; 將...發回重審
- Sep 27 Mon 2010 21:54
Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel Inc. 英美侵權法筆記
Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel
Fisher 與轉盤汽車旅館公司
action for assault and battery 攻擊和毆打的行動
plaintiff起訴人, 原告
Mathematician數學家
Attending負責指導實習的
conference會議
Telemetry遙測技術, 測距術
Defendant被告
Luncheon午餐
Buffet自助餐, 快餐
Snatch奪走, 奪得
Plate盤子, 盆, 碟
Shouted呼喊, 喊叫
Negro黑人
Was not actually touched沒被實際上接觸
Apprehension恐懼, 憂慮, 擔心, 掛念
physical injury身体上的伤害
embarrassed窘的, 尷尬的
by the conduct in the presence of his associates對他的行為
Jury陪審團
returned被送回的; 歸來的; 回國的
verdict(陪審團的)裁決, 裁定
actual實際的, 事實上的
humiliation羞辱
indignity輕蔑, 屈辱; 侮辱言行, 無禮舉動
exemplary模範的; 懲戒性的; 示範的
punitive懲罰的
the trial court set aside the verdict and gave judgment for the defendants notwithstandingthe verdict審訊法庭留出了定案並且給了被告notwithstandingthe定案的評斷
trial court 初審法庭
set aside--- 撥出, 宣告無效, 駁回, 不理會 留出一個空間
judgment 審判; 裁判; 判決
affirm斷言, 申明, 堅稱 被確認
court of civil appeals民用呼籲法院
supreme court 高等法院
difficulty 困難
holding把持支持; 保持 (常複數)持有股份; 保有地 認為; 持有(見解等)
intentional有意的, 故意的
grabbing攫取, 抓取
constituted構成, 組成
battery毆打
invasion入侵, 侵略
manner方式, 方法
sufficient足夠的, 充分的
unique唯一的, 獨一無二的; 獨特的
jurisprudence法律學
committed忠誠的, 堅定的
hold握著; 抓住; 夾住 托住; 支承
assault攻擊, 襲擊; 譴責, 抨擊
trespass擅自進入 打擾; 妨礙[(+on/upon)]
findings研究結果
dispossessed無依無靠的; 失去產業的; 被逐出的
indignity輕蔑, 屈辱; 侮辱言行, 無禮舉動
rationale基本理由
restatement再聲明; 重申
essence本質, 實質; 要素; 本體
grievance不滿, 不平; 抱怨, 牢騷
consist in在於
involved複雜的
offense罪過; 犯法(行為); 過錯
inviolability不可侵犯
necessary必要的, 必需的
actual實際的, 事實上的
disturbed心亂的; 心理不正常的
unpermitted未容許
contact with聯絡與
customarily習慣上, 習俗上, 通常
partaking參加, 參與
actionable可控告的, 可起訴的
cane手杖, 柺杖
grasped抓牢; 握緊; 抱住
intimately熟悉地; 親密地, 親切地
universally普遍地; 一般地; 人人
forceful強有力的; 堅強的
dispossession驅逐; 奪取
sufficient足夠的, 充分的
erred犯錯誤
granting同意, 准予
Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel Inc.p35 翻譯
關於攻擊與毆打的行為 原告 一位受雇於nasa的數學家 正在被告的旅館參加一場有關於遙測設備的專業會議 這場會議包含商業午餐 當原告和大家一樣站一排時 一位被告的員工接近他並從原告手中搶奪盤子 並大吼 一個黑人不應該被服務在這俱樂部 原告並沒有被確實的碰觸而且身體上並沒有任何身體上的憂慮及傷害 但是原告對被告員工的行為感到極度尷尬和受傷 陪審團送來裁決對於他的實際傷害(羞辱和無理舉動)做出400美元的判賠和額外的500美金作為懲罰
初審法院駁回這個裁決並給予被告此判決不成立 這被由民事法院確認 原告不服上訴至高等法院
greenhill justice***在這個案子下的事實 我們毫無疑問的見解故意的抓取原告的盤子構成毆打 這個從某人手中搶奪某物品的故意行為明確的是一個冒犯他人身體的行為 為構成一個攻擊與毆打的行為 是沒有必要去碰觸原告的身體甚至是他的衣服或搶奪任何東西從原告手中碰觸任何身體部位 所以是足夠構成一個冒犯的行為 morgan v loyacomo. 190 miss 656.1 so.2d 510 (1941)
如此的見解在法律學並不是獨一無二的 In S.H. Kress co. v brashier . 50 S.W.2D 922 (Tex.civ.App.1932. no write). 被告持有忠誠的 一個攻擊或妨礙人 靠搶奪一本書從原告手中 陪審團發現從那個案子被告 從原告手中逐出的書 引起他遭受羞辱
由於原告的不滿在於對於原告不可侵犯的人格和複雜不被容許和故意的羞辱行為而不是任何身體上的傷害 這不需要原告身體上的被侵犯
嘿嘿翻譯沒打完 我好懶 =.=......................